Counterinsurgency operations manual

As noted above, the key for counterinsurgents is knowing when more force is needed—and when it might be counterproductive. This paradox is really a corollary to the previous one. As the level of insurgent violence drops, the requirements of international law and the expectations of the populace lead to a reduction in direct military actions by counterinsurgents.

More reliance is placed on police work, rules of engagement may be tightened, and troops may have to exercise increased restraint. Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more risk to maintain involvement with the people. Often insurgents carry out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose of enticing counterinsurgents to overreact, or at least to react in a way that insurgents can exploit—for example, opening fire on a crowd or executing a clearing operation that creates more enemies than it takes off the streets.

If an assessment of the effects of a course of action determines that more negative than positive effects may result, an alternative should be considered—potentially including not acting. Counterinsurgents often achieve the most meaningful success in garnering public support and legitimacy for the HN government with activities that do not involve killing insurgents though, again, killing clearly will often be necessary. Particularly after security has been achieved, dollars and ballots will have more important effects than bombs and bullets.

Everyone has a role in nation building, not just Department of State and civil affairs personnel. It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done.

Where the United States is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable HN leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant U. The longer that process takes, the more U.

General Creighton Abrams, the U. And we retarded the Vietnamese by doing it. The nearer we get to that the better off they are and the better off we are. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.

Experience, knowledge of the AO, and cultural sensitivity are essential to deciding when such action is necessary. Nor does it necessarily involve spending lots of money on expensive public-works projects that the locals may not want and will be unable to operate on their own. It does mean addressing the desire of the people for self-determination and the delivery of some basic governmental services. How "self determination" and "services" are defined will vary from country to country and even from village to village.

It is the foremost responsibility of a commander in a COIN environment to understand the unique human and geographical terrain on which the maneuver forces operate. Lawrence attributed his success in aiding the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire to "hard study and brain-work and concentration," an example at odds with what he denounced as the "fundamental, crippling, incuriousness" of many fellow officers who were "too much body and too little head.

First, maneuver leaders should become familiar with the relevant Army doctrine, which in turn can provide leaders with a context for studying history.

Second, once familiar with relevant doctrine, leaders should read books and articles that provide an overview of irregular warfare operations since ancient times as well as accounts of its evolution since the early 20 th century. Next, leaders might study a specific COIN operation in which integration of whole-of-government efforts made possible the defeat or significant diminution of the enemy. Conversely leaders should also look at unsuccessful COIN campaigns to see what mistakes to avoid. Counterinsurgency Discussion Linkedin Page.

MCoE Homepage. Counterinsurgency "Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge. An Approach to the Study of COIN: First, maneuver leaders should become familiar with the relevant Army doctrine, which in turn can provide leaders with a context for studying history. Reflections What are some principles, which you have identified, that have not changed with the evolution of technology? As technology develops, how do you think insurgency and counterinsurgency will evolve?

What deficiencies have you identified in your own understanding of COIN? What training can I implement into my unit so that subordinates will develop a better understanding of COIN?

How did the leaders who led successful COIN operations in the past prepare prior to combat? Maneuver Self Study Program Survey. FM Counterinsurgency warfare : theory and practice by David Galula. It applies to every soldier in the army regardless of service branch, MOS, or rank. This manual also contains both doctrine and training guidance on map reading and land navigation.

First compiled as a reference for soldiers in guerrilla warfare situations without access to conventional weapons and supplies, this guide is full of potentially life-saving details on the construction of improvised munitions. Everything you ever wanted to know about boobytraps Initially published in , this official U. Army document gives you access to insider, military-grade information on the characteristics, use, detection, and removal of boobytraps.