Teskilati mahsusa pdf

This makes history the struggle area of humankind. As known formal history can conclude solid answers to the ideas of informal history which is very popular throughout the Turkish civilization history in the country, only if it can fulfill the gaps within itself.

It is a pity many of the Turkish historical characters having critique importance in solving the debates, are not fully investigated. This article is on Sari Efe Edip, a mysterious gunman ofProgress and Union, playing a major role within the national struggle as being a famous leader of national warriors.

The main purpose of the article is not to pontificate on history but to become the only article written completely on Sari Efe Edip, putting a sign note to the thesis on Turkish history. Apak, Meclis'e, I. Meclis II. Derhal karar verdim. Dural, A. Obut, Rabia Nur? Download PDF. This, in turn, has led to a distorted conception of the organization in the scholarship. Aside from a few exceptional works, relatively impartial studies emerging since the s have added very little in the way of new analysis to discussions of the SO, and are marred by confusing, vague, and irregular sets of assumptions regarding the organization.

Research on the late Ottoman and early Republican eras is ill served by such shoddy scholarship, as studies pass over methodological depth and the critical use of sources in favour of polemic and historical revisionism. The fact that no Downloaded by [ ] at 03 February comprehensive review of the literature on the SO has been written since , however, does not make the task of rectifying the deplorable situation of SO scholarship an easy one.

That is the aim of this study. This article will begin by examining the formative period of SO studies from the s to the s. It will then move on to an account of the impact of the ideologically motivated debates that emerged after the end of Cold War. Thirdly, the position of the relatively impartial scholarly studies that have emerged from the s onwards will be discussed.

The SO has long been the subject of immense public interest in Turkey, particularly from the early s onward; its political—military dimensions and legitimacy have excited many columnists and experts. Despite the enigmatic lure of the topic, the concrete and theoretical problems that arise in the examination of the SO appear to have come to outweigh its appeal.

Historians have been more attracted to the major strategic decisions of the Ottoman ruling class leading to the eventual disintegration of the empire than they have to subjects of secondary importance like the SO. This historiographical vacuum has also paved the way for a myriad of speculations and aesthetic and ethical concerns to dominate historical analysis of the subject. The undisputed status of Philip H. He wrote his dissertation in the aftermath of the Second World War, at a time when orientalism was taking hold in the American academia and was being reshaped according to the dictates of the new global political reality of the Cold War.

The limited information he had about these regions forced him to employ a more holistic approach, focusing not only on the actions of the SO itself but also on the ideological and political motivations out of which these actions sprang.

Despite the shaky foundations of this alternative paradigm, it is often used as basic source material without any analytical scrutiny. The emergence of this alternative paradigm is alarming for a number of reasons. Politics in Turkey has come to question the historical stages through which the country has passed and what course it should take in the future. One of the historical dimensions of such debates, moreover, is directly related to the role of secret services in the Ottoman decision-making process and Downloaded by [ ] at 03 February military operations during the late Ottoman period.

In this context, the SO, with all of its mystery, has taken its place at the centre of these debates. These anti-pluralistic views bring with them one-dimensional historical narratives, historical drama better suited to a novel than a history book. This tension is most clearly visible in the theses that have sprung up concerning the relation of the SO to the forcible relocation of the Armenians and also deep state and band warfare in this context and anti-imperialism.

On the one hand there is the argument, advanced by those who believe that the Armenian relocations constituted genocide, that the SO was a central actor in the events in question. Support for this thesis, mainly developed by Vahakn N. Dadrian,9 among liberal-left circles in Turkey merits attention, especially when one takes into account the great lengths Turkish leftists are willing to go to avoid siding with nationalists. On the other hand there is the argument, advanced by many opponents of the genocide thesis, that the SO was an anti-imperialist revolutionary organization.

These two diametrically opposed and reductionist approaches are examples of the methodological pitfalls entailed when approaching the SO with political motivation in tow. Both approaches oversimplify and overgeneralize the nature of the SO and its activities. Besides such methodological handicaps, this tension also leads some revisionists to attempt to prove the SO to be what they already think it is, seeking out proof for their preconceived ideas in the sources of the SO.

Both sets of historians fail to go beyond their pre-conceived notions because of their use of unhistorical methods in their search for answers to their research questions. This unhistorical approach on the part of authors is largely to blame for the polarized, even schizophrenic, depiction of the SO in the literature. None of this means that researchers should avoid subjects that touch on current political issues. On the contrary, scholars should bring the SO to bear on the questions of anti-imperialism and the Armenian question.

But researchers must bear in mind that to set out on a research project with Downloaded by [ ] at 03 February the goal of propping up a preconceived political agenda is to put the cart in front of the horse. The s marked the beginning of a period of relatively easy access to archives relating to the SO. This approach is most clearly seen in regional studies describing developments in the operational bases of the SO.

Despite the weakness of studies describing developments in the operational bases of the SO, this area of study seems to be richest in terms of archival material. Doing so would in turn pierce the shroud of mystery surrounding the SO.

It is high time, however, to begin developing research questions that will allow us to see SO in its entirety.

This will Downloaded by [ ] at 03 February require a critical re-evaluation of both the available archival material and secondary sources. None of this should be taken to mean that existing studies have no value. Another similar problem is the fragmentary nature of almost all studies concerning the SO, excepting those of Tunaya, Shaw, and Stoddard.

Whether this is a strength or a weakness depends on the nature of the subject. In the face of lack of data bits and pieces of information, even if they are vague, may make it easier to get a glimpse of the historical reality.

Fragmentary information on a multifaceted and multifunctional organization like the SO tends to result in misunderstanding more often than insight, thus seriously distorting the historical reality.

A common mistake, for example, is the view that the SO was an intelligence service. It is true that the SO, much like modern intelligence services, engaged in small-scale intelligence activities in collaboration with other state institutions. The information it gathered was passed up the chain to the Second Branch, which was the real military intelligence service, collecting information from a host of other organizations in addition to the SO.

The SO, then, can only be said to have been an intelligence agency to an extent that the Ottoman embassies and governorates were. They were both sources of intelligence, not intelligence services in their own right. Hence, attributing every intelligence matter during the First World War to the SO can only be understood as the product of overgeneralization on the basis of fragmentary information.

Treating the SO as the precursor of modern Turkish intelligence services complicates matters further. To do so is to establish a direct and chronologically contiguous relation between the SO and the intelligence services of the Turkish Republic. The recent increase in the number of studies intending to establish a connection, positively or negatively, between the SO and the secret services of the Republican period is thus not entirely coincidental.

The extent of the internal changes that took place in the transition from the SO to the OEA has never been the subject of concerted study. To do so leaves one with the misguided impression that the old structures and leadership remained intact. There are simply too many unknowns in between.

This problematic approach, on the other hand, gives the impression that the static Ottoman intelligence system underwent a total change in a very short period of time without any preliminary preparation. The problem with this account, too, lies in the fact that there is ample evidence that the SO was not simply an intelligence service, as mentioned earlier, but also an early form of unconventional warfare organization.

Another problem with the modernization thesis is a lack of convincing works documenting earlier examples of intelligence services in the Ottoman State.

Even if the necessity of Ottoman modernization led to the creation of the SO, such necessities should not legitimize overlooking the internal dynamics that were instrumental in its foundation. Thanks to a lack of data and interest, however, such analysis still has a long way Downloaded by [ ] at 03 February to go before reaching its full potential. The well-balanced approach Nur Bilge Criss adopts in her account of the SO lays stress on a dimension normally ignored in the literature: although the SO was ostensibly annulled with the Mudros Armistice of , it continued to carry out its paramilitary and intelligence activities.

This is to say that the SO represented a transition toward later underground organizations. Finally, it should be noted that the standard history of the First World War prepared by ATASE includes a considerable amount of information on the agents of the SO, including the platoon they were attached to as well as the quality and quantity of the soldiers its agents commanded.

He did not bring a pre-conceived agenda to his research.